The West Needs to Stop Obsessing About Putin

Whether the Western media views Russian President Vladimir Putin as losing or winning, as strong or weak, as having a plan or lacking one entirely, it focuses almost exclusively on him as the driving force behind everything that happens in Russia and everything Russia does abroad. For good reason. Putin’s aggression is one of the top foreign policy challenges today. From Ukraine to Syria, no one stands in starker opposition to the Western world order.

Thus, Putin must go.  Focusing on the man, however, ignores the system that he’s put into place, and that system is the key to understanding today’s Russia and how we should deal with it.

The West’s Putin obsession feeds the misconception that if Putin were to step down tomorrow, Russia would be able to democratize and retake its place in the international community. Perhaps at one point in the early 2000s the removal of Putin would have made it possible for Russia to avoid a darker path. But that thought is no more than fantasy today. Putin is the central figure in the government apparatus, and members of his government cannot envision a Russia without him. Yet he has made the political future of Russia unstable by co-opting its political system, twisting it to serve himself and the elite who serve him, instead of the Russian people, and forging a system of rule that will, paradoxically, survive him and hinder democratization.

Putin’s regime is not an effective, responsive government. He has based his authority on corruption, the negation of basic political rights, the alternating appeasement and subjugation of the oligarchs, and manipulation of his people through control of the media. Even if Putin felt secure enough to appoint a successor who would guarantee him immunity from prosecution, as Putin did for Yeltsin, that successor would face problems simply by not being Putin.

This does not mean that Putin must stay for the sake of stability, or that his presence guarantees stability. Russia is not a stable country under Putin. Since the invasion of Crimea, the ruble has lost 50 percent of its value in relation to the dollar, Russia’s GDP has dropped by almost 1 trillion dollars since 2013, and Russia’s oil and gas industry has a bleak future. Russia is not a status quo international actor, as its mischief-making in Ukraine and muscle-flexing in Syria demonstrate. And with xenophobia and propaganda-induced nationalist hysteria on the rise, it could get worse, especially if a more erratic, nationalist politician were to succeed, or supplant, Putin.

If democracy is to have any hope in Russia, change must be organic, with the Russian people at its head. Democratic reformers hope that Putin’s powerbase, with its reliance on economics and the menace of external enemies, eventually crumbles and collapses under its own weight. Putin’s increasingly unpredictable behavior, spinning from crisis to crisis as he tries to maintain momentum and keep his people’s attention away from the country’s economic downturn and the population’s lack of basic rights and democratic freedoms, does not seem sustainable in the long term. Democratic hopefuls may get their wish.

An implosion may not bring about a positive outcome, however, as Russia’s own experience with the dismantling of the Soviet Union shows. The chaotic end of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent rollercoaster of what the West called reform, but many Russians called ruin, had frightening consequences. It largely discredited democracy in the eyes of Russians. They do not want to go through anything similar again.

The sad truth is that only time and more failure can push Putin from his throne. Direct external pressure will only serve to ignite the volatile mix of nationalism and fear—of the past and the future—that reigns in Russia. The West must do its best to make Putin an anachronism, to show Russians that there is a better world. If the United States wants to see Putin out of power, it must be ready for a Russia without Putin and a period of turmoil that could make the end of the Soviet Union look downright peaceful in comparison. The media can help by focusing less on Putin as an epic villain and more on the system that he’s created, how that system blights Russia’s present, and the problems it is likely to bequeath to our common future.  

Simon Hoellerbauer is a research intern with the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Project on Democratic Transitions and a graduate of Kenyon College. He can be found on Twitter at @hoellerbauers. Melinda Haring is a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. 

 

Tags: , ,

Putin’s Hidden Victims

It has been nearly three years since Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law banning American families from adopting Russian children.  Many viewed the law as retaliation for the Magnitsky Act, which the US Congress had passed the month before, rebuking the Russian government for its terrible human rights record. Putin’s tit-for-tat response brought Russia’s deplorable human rights situation— especially in Russian orphanages—into focus.

Harvard Law professor and child welfare expert Elizabeth Bartholet described the ban as “cynical and brutal.”

But the outrage was not limited to the international community. Even within Russia there was a significant backlash.  Shortly after Putin announced the ban, 20,000 Russians marched with protest signs, shouting “Shame on the scum!”  Putin’s political game unfairly victimized children and condemned many to live out their childhoods in state-run institutions.

Putin responded to the criticism coyly. “We must do all we can so that orphaned children find their families in their home country, in Russia,” he said.

Today there are approximately 700,000 children in the country’s orphanage system. Nearly 95 percent have at least one living parent.  These children are not “orphans” in the traditional sense; the government coined the handy phrase “social orphan” to describe children whose parents have relinquished their parental rights.  According to official statistics, more than 100,000 children are abandoned annually.

Prior to Putin’s draconian ban, Americans adopted the highest number of Russian children each year.  In 2011, Americans adopted more than 1,000.

While developed countries rejected orphanages decades ago—placing children in adopted families or foster care—Russia has maintained its vast labyrinth of institutions, which house children from birth to the age of emancipation (generally age 17). The orphanage system and the physical buildings themselves are holdovers from the Soviet Union. Children are typically undernourished and receive inadequate medical care. International human rights organizations have documented physical abuse and neglect of the children in Russia’s residential care, including the widespread practice of tying children with ropes or rags to their cribs, leaving children lying on floors for hours at a time, and medicating children with sedatives to get them to sleep.  

Children in orphanages are isolated and hidden from view.  They do not attend regular schools, and the education they receive within the orphanage, if any, is insufficient. The official protocols state that children in residential care should not visit family members for fear that they may get used to the attention and become “spoiled.”

The situation for children with disabilities is even worse. Disabled children spend the vast majority of their day in so-called “lying down” rooms—rooms with cribs where children are left in cribs or on floor mats, unable to move. They have few, if any, opportunities to play outside, interact with other children, or play with toys.

State officials and doctors often pressure parents of children with disabilities to relinquish their parental rights, making the false claim that state institutions can provide better care for children with special needs. This pressure accounts for why more than 40 percent of children in residential care have some form of disability.

Back in 2012, as Russia banned US adoptions, the government promised to ramp up its efforts to de-institutionalize children and place them in families. But for the hundreds of thousands of children trapped in the system, Putin’s promises have amounted to very little.  His adoption ban, ostensibly aimed at harming the United States, has denied thousands of children the opportunity to escape Russia’s orphanages and become part of a family.

If Putin’s administration wants make good on its 2012 promise, it should take three steps immediately: first, it should increase the resources for programs and initiatives to keep families together and prevent children, especially disabled children, from entering the orphanage system; second, it should accelerate the process of de-institutionalizing children by increasing the number of adoptions both domestic and international and encouraging Russian citizens to become foster parents; and third, it should improve the care children in state institutions receive, ensuring that children are not abused and that they receive adequate nutrition, medical care, and education.

It’s time to put an end to the horrific treatment of Putin’s hidden victims and demand that Russia modernize its backward orphanages.  

Shonda Werry is an expert on Russia and international adoption. Melinda Haring is a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.  

Tags: , , , , ,

Georgia’s Former President Saakashvili appointed the New Governor of Odessa: Implications for Georgia and Ukraine

President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko has appointed Georgia’s former President Mikheil Saakashvili the new governor of Ukraine’s key Odessa region. It is difficult to decipher the bizzare news, but considering the implications this move could have for both Ukraine and Georgia, the issue merits some meditation.

      

How are Georgians reacting?

What caused the biggest outrage in Georgia was the fact that by accepting the Ukrainian citizenship (required by Ukrainian law in order for one to take office in government) Saakashvili automatically lost, thus deliberately gave up, his Georgian citizenship. It is certainly an unorthodox move for a former president of one country to first give up citizenship of his own country, and second take political office in another country, especially a position that is of much lower rank than that of a presidential office.

Georgian citizenship is something Georgian politicians have taken lightly for a long time,[1] but we’ve seen it used as a tool of political maneuvering recently. In the 2012 parliamentary elections when the Georgian Dream Coalition was formed under the leadership of billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, his lack of Georgian citizenship became an issue. According to Georgian citizenship laws, one automatically loses Georgian citizenship when accepting another. However, it is viewed as a mere technicality, as Georgia allows its citizens to have dual citizenship, which is achieved by requesting to be “granted Georgian citizenship by law of exception.” Ivanishvili had become a Russian and a French citizen, and had never reapplied for Georgian citizenship. Legally he was not allowed to run for office. He later gave up his Russian citizenship and asked for Georgian citizenship—a process that was dragged out for months, and put on a public display by Saakashvili’s government, adding to the already high pre-election campaign pressures. To be sure, this was a process Saakashvili himself was directly involved in, as granting Georgian citizenship is the president’s job there.

Ukraine on the other hand does not allow dual citizenship. Whoever becomes a citizen of Ukraine has to give up his/her other citizenship within two years of obtaining Ukrainian citizenship. In a recent interview given to the Georgian television channel Imedi, Saakashvili, among many other things, explained the reasoning behind this move. It appears that: (1) he sees the issue of citizenship as a technicality to comply with the bureaucratic requirements of taking political office in Ukraine; (2) he does plan to return to Georgia with the hopes of reentering Georgian politics; and (3) he believes in his Georgian supporters more than they believe in him. He thinks all of this will be undone soon, with support of his Georgian voters.

In the interview Saakashvili said that “taking away my Georgian citizenship is the [Georgian] president’s prerogative [this would be in the form of the president rejecting Saakashvili’s application for being granted Georgian citizenship by the law of exception]. If he decides to take my citizenship away, I am sure, this will not be a deciding factor, because for the moment when I return to Georgia, and this will happen much sooner than many imagine, people will make them rescind the indictments against me as well as the act of stripping me of my Georgian citizenship.” Moreover, he went on to explain how he does not see the lack of citizenship as an obstacle. “Eduard Shevardnadze was not a Georgian citizen when he went to Georgia and became its leader; nor was Ivanishvili, when he was running around, conducting his pre-election campaign and became the leader of Georgia. Thus citizenship issue was never an obstacle for anyone, why should it become one for me?”

While he may be technically correct, Saakashvili may have strongly miscalculated this move. Let us set aside for a moment the implications this move will have on Ukraine. All along, Saakashvili has still believed that a comeback as Georgia’s leader was possible for him. He has been counting on the incompetence of the current government—if they bring enough poverty and setbacks to Georgia (which the current Georgian government has already partly achieved), Saakashvili and his party would then regain the people’s confidence, and would be “obligated” to return by popular demand. The Georgian Dream Coalition government may be losing approval ratings due to the worsening economic conditions in the country (the lari has been plummeting since November 2014), but this does not automatically mean that there will be popular demand for Saakashvili in Georgia any time soon (a recent National Democratic Institute poll shows that only 16% of Georgians would vote for Saakashvili’s party). Additionally, if there was any possibility of Saakashvili regaining popularity in Georgia by some miracle, those chances have now been severely diminished thanks to his Ukrainian venture.

The president in exile waited for the Georgian officials to drop charges, but ran out of patience. As he expressed,

…what does Georgian citizenship mean to me today?! Today for me Georgian citizenship means sitting in a prison cell, along with my other friends… therefore, this is purely a matter of formality, although I wanted to avoid it. … I cannot go to Georgia, whether I am a citizen or not, what difference does it make. Therefore as soon as the people make them [the government] void the indictments, when the time comes, they will also resolve the issue of my citizenship. I will distance myself from this formality, but I will always be nearby, whenever the Georgian people desire, if they need me for anything.

Browsing local headlines, this move appears to be seen as a betrayal by many Georgians. Saakashvili and his team are infamous for their impeccable PR skills, yet for someone who wants to return to Georgian politics one day, this is a huge miscalculation. Even his supporters, or what is left of them, are seeing this as a negative move. Georgian government officials have openly condemned his actions. The current president Margvelashvili called it “dishonorable behavior,” saying that with this move Saakashvili has “disgraced the country and the institution of presidency. … A former president should not have given up Georgian citizenship. … Values are more important than career, and these values include being a Georgian citizen. His behavior is incomprehensible to me.”

What does this mean for Ukraine?

So, what is Odessa inheriting from Georgia in Saakashvili? His reforms took Georgia from a nearly failed state to a booming tourist destination with a rapidly growing economy. Foreign direct investment began pouring in thanks to the highly favorable investing conditions Saakashvili created. Rampant corruption and crime disappeared and gave way to high GDP growth rates, free and fair elections, and westernization. The rapid reforms came at a high price for Georgia’s democracy, however. Saakashvili was never able to let go of the power that he had to concentrate in his own hands in the first place in order to effectively implement the reforms. Towards the end of his presidency it became clear that crucial democratic reforms had taken a backseat to the president’s insatiable appetite for contemplating and implementing major development projects in Georgia. At some point Saakashvili swapped out, or even mistook, development for democracy and became unapologetic about being the sole decision-maker in Georgia.

As we’ve already seen, American, Georgian (Saakashvili’s teammates), and Lithuanian individuals were granted Ukrainian citizenship since Poroshenko came into office, so they could take key positions in government. Saakashvili himself was Poroshenko’s advisor on a freelance basis until recently. He had been offered official government positions in Ukraine but had not accepted them. When asked why he turned down these jobs he cited various reasons. Sometimes it was the fact that he did not understand Ukrainian political culture and did not think he could be a part of it. He also said that he did not want to give up his Georgian citizenship (as he was still hoping the charges against him would be dropped and he would return to Georgia after the long exile). And lastly, in an interview earlier this year he expressed that he had reservations over the idea of “having to play nice with others” by working with other political actors in order to achieve consensus to get things done. It looks like the complete autonomy of power is something that Saakashvili is still strongly keen on. Based on Poroshenko’s speech announcing Saakashvili’s appointment, it looks like Saakashvili got exactly that, a full carte blanche to do what he pleases with Odessa, as long as he achieves there what he achieved in Georgia—rapid development and modernization through even faster and effective overnight reforms.

Putting the issue of democracy aside, Saakashvili is likely to achieve these goals in Odessa, but as with Georgia, what will be the cost of this success? Odessa is a region of high strategic importance for Ukraine, but also for Putin’s strategic agenda. Appointing Saakashvili as the head of that region is a direct insult to Putin who infamously despises Saakashvili.[2] If this is not a step back in Ukraine’s attempts at ending the war in its eastern territories, it is certainly not a step forward either. Additionally, now there is a new scenario where Saakashvili could be setting himself up for losing another war with Russia, this time in Odessa.

Yes, Ukraine is desperate for immediate reforms, and there is not enough capacity domestically to implement them effectively. Thus the international community should gladly welcome any bold steps that Poroshenko takes towards achieving that goal. However, the most baffling part in this story is that all of Saakashvili’s competence and expertise could be very effectively utilized from behind the scenes had he chosen to do so, without risking further worsening of already lethal Ukraine-Russia relations.

Notes


[1] Vast number of Georgian government officials, current and past, have dual citizenships. The practice of “bringing back” a successful Georgian from abroad and awarding them Georgian citizenship before appointing them to a government position was one that Saakashvili used quite frequently.

[2] For the second half of Saakashvili’s presidency Georgia and Russia did not even have diplomatic ties. The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia got very personal between the two leaders and since then they do not attempt to conceal their hatred for each other in public. 

Tags: , , , , , , ,

A weekend in the life of Ramzan Kadyrov on Instagram: his wisdom on marriage, anti-terrorism, and the conspiracy surrounding Tsarnaev’s sentencing.

About a year ago my colleague Alex Fisher and I wrote about Russia’s homegrown terrorism problem. In our article we argued that if the two Chechen wars of the 1990s did not actually create the terrorism problem in the Russian North Caucasus, they certainly helped worsen things a great deal. The inhumane tactics used by the Russian government and its cronies in Chechnya to hunt down rebels left the North Caucasus mountains infested with terrorist groups in hiding. The self-declared “Islamic State of the Caucasus Emirate” is responsible for countless terrorist attacks in many Russian towns including, but not limited to, Grozny. The moral of our story was that Chechnya (as well as Dagestan) is Russia’s ticking bomb. Currently it is stable, but entirely unpredictable. Putin has poured a lot of money into achieving this seemingly stable state in Chechnya. He has heavily invested in local actors who carry out his zero tolerance policy when it comes to dealing with terrorists in Russia. One such noteworthy local actor is Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya who has quickly risen to international fame for many reasons, foremost of them being his close relationship with Vladimir Putin.

Now, with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Chechnya and the North (and even the South) Caucasus in general have been receiving renewed international attention. There have been continuous reports of foreign fighters pouring out of the region to join ISIS (as of February 2015 there were approximately 1700 Russian nationals fighting alongside ISIS). Additionally, Putin’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere have drawn a great deal of attention to Russia itself. For example, when the world became outraged over the news of Boris Nemtsov’s murder[1] in Moscow, Kadyrov made headlines as many had connected the murder to his terrorist-fighting elite paramilitary security forces “Kadyrovtsy.” An article by The Moscow Times argued that Putin had overly spoiled Kadyrov and was not exactly in full control of him anymore. There have also been reports that Kadyrov has risen to higher ranks within Putin’s team and may eventually end up at the top of the Russian government. 

For those of us who closely observe the region, following the Chechnya news has been made somewhat amusing thanks to Kadyrov’s excellent social media skills. He happens to be an avid Twitter and Instagram user, frequently making media headlines across the world with his posts. For example, quite often he posts pictures of Putin on Instagram declaring his love and allegiance to him. This past winter he wrote that he was willing to die for Putin. 

However, this past weekend was especially eventful for Kadyrov on social media. He used his Instagram account to comment on two major events: a controversial wedding in Chechnya and the Tsarnaev sentencing.

Earlier this month Kadyrov received scrutiny for approving of and participating in a wedding of one of the members of his administration, who married a 17 year old–reportedly against her will. The wedding video shows a grim bride, barely saying “yes” to marrying the man during the civil ceremony. Later she is seen standing aside, not taking part in, the wedding celebrations where the honorable guest, Mr. Kadyrov, joyfully dances Lezginka with other guests. The Daily Beast reports that this is the second wife for the 47 year-old Nazhuda Guchigov, who has children older than his 17 year-old bride Louisa. Moreover, there were stories reporting that the bride’s family was blackmailed into allowing this marriage. Kadyrov defended this union in a long post on Instagram saying the allegations of forced marriage were incorrect.

Yes, the wedding video may simply be showing a shy Muslim bride, nothing out of the ordinary for local customs. And even if this wedding was a result of threats and blackmail, marriages like this are very common in that part of the world, and have been for centuries. However, this wedding resonated with many Russians, outside of Chechnya, who condemn polygamy. The practice is unlawful in Russia.

Watching this video, Russians began to ask, “is Chechnya not Russia?” This ultimately shows that Kadyrov is not accountable to the rule of law in Russia, but would he be the only Russian official who blatantly disregards the law? Between the Putin’s government’s unorthodox economic measures to bail out Russian businesses during the ruble crisis, to issuing laws that severely limit freedom of speech in Russia, to the widespread abuse of human rights especially when it comes to the rights of the LGBT community, Kadyrov is not exactly leading by example, he is simply following the one set by Putin. 

After addressing critics of this “wedding of the millennium” as he referred to it, Kadyrov went on to share his opinions about Dzokhar Tsarnayev’s sentencing last week. On his Instagram page, Kadyrov posted a picture of Tsarnayev. The long caption to the picture offers some wisdom from an experienced terrorist hunter and reads like this: 

“Dear Friends, Dzokhar Tsarnayev was sentenced to death. This news comes as no surprise… …Yes, I am in support of aggressive war against terrorism.” The seemingly supportive sentiments take a strange turn when he adds: “any person with evil intentions should be neutralized … But I don’t like it when a spectacle is played out under the guise of fighting terrorism. … Tamerlan Tsarnayev was killed under very strange circumstances. Ibrahim Todashev was shot during interrogation. Dzhokhar Tsarnayev was put behind the bars. … He was quickly charged under three dozen articles.” This is where Kadyrov’s comments begin to sound like he is hinting at some sort of conspiracy. He goes on to say that the brothers came to America at a very young age, they studied hard, took up sports, music… The older brother married, had a child… “The ideal biography for a gubernatorial candidate.” Kadyrov asks, “Who made them terrorists? Who taught them to so skillfully prepare bombs, plan the attack without getting found out? … I do not believe that Tsarnayevs were able to do this without knowledge attained from the US Special Forces, if they even did this at all. … If the US and Europe are really committed to antiterrorism, why are they spreading it in the Middle East?” Finally he asks “yes, if they put Tsarnayev to death, what guarantee do we have that they won’t find him innocent later on? This happens often in the United States. … He was nine years old when he came to the United States. And America, in which he believed, made him into a terrorist.”

***

So, what are some of the takeaways here? First, it is clear that even under the watch of Putin’s close ally, Chechnya is still not Russia. It appears that while Kadyrov may be willing to give up his life for Putin, he would not give up the autonomy of his power so easily. Between that and the fact that Chechen terrorists are still well and alive[2], Chechnya continues to be a problem area for Russia–and one that merits close monitoring.

Second, the anti-American sentiment is so prominent among Russian leaders that even on an issue like anti-terrorism, arguably the only thing the two sides could see eye-to-eye on at the moment, there is very little hope for cooperation. Conveniently for the Russian government, Kadyrov takes a dual position: he comes out strongly against terrorism in order to discourage it within Russia, but on the other hand he also manages to maintain the anti-US position that Russian leaders would approve of, accusing the US for turning Tsarnaev brothers into terrorists.

 


[1] Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was shot to death in Moscow on February 27, 2015. The assassination sparked major international outrage, many accusing Putin’s government of ordering the murder.

[2] There was a suicide terrorist bombing in Grozny as recently as October 2014. Five people were reported killed and 12 injured.  

Tags: , , , , , ,

Bundeswehr 2.0: A German Military for a New Normal

A visit to Germany’s military history museum in Dresden reveals just how deeply ambivalent modern Germany is about its military, the Bundeswehr.  One account described it as “a meditation on mankind’s addiction to state violence.”  No wonder that Germany—despite being Europe’s most populous and wealthiest country—has continuously cut the size of the Bundeswehr since the end of the Cold War.  While much of that was warranted, given the disappearance of the Soviet threat, today’s Bundeswehr is not only a fraction of its former self (and half the size of the French military), but also apparently in a state of disrepair, according to an independent review of the Bundeswehr’s combat readiness last September.[1]

Germany Military

Hence, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel travelled to Moscow to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his aggression in Ukraine, she did so without the benefit of military power to back her efforts.  Instead, German diplomats have sought to use Germany’s economic power as leverage to shape Russia’s behavior.  Far better, they argue, to avoid competing with Russia on military terms, in which Germany is weak and Russia holds “escalation dominance.”  But economic power clearly has its limits, as Russia has yet to end its intervention in eastern Ukraine.  That has led even those Germans who have long been sympathetic to Moscow to consider whether there has been a fundamental shift in Russian posture—one that might require Germany to address through a stronger defense.  For the first time in decades, Bundestag legislators have begun to discuss the need to strengthen the Bundeswehr.[2]

But what kind of Bundeswehr is needed?  Surely, it must be one that is consistent with Germany’s vision of itself, if Germans are ever to embrace it.  It should be tailored for a mission that most German citizens can agree is in Germany’s national interest, such as the security of Central Europe.  It should also be one that can meaningfully contribute to NATO’s collective defense, but does not put its neighbors ill at ease.  As such, one could envision a Bundeswehr that is designed—through its armaments and force structure—to be fundamentally defensive, yet still beneficial to NATO.

From the way the German army chose to pare back its equipment after the Cold War, it is clear that its leaders sought to preserve as much of the combat capabilities of its heavy armored units as possible.  But by 2010 that was no longer possible, as the numbers of its main battle tanks (MBT) and armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) plunged.  Rather than rebuild its army on a foundation of MBTs, Germany could equip it with more defensive weapon systems, like AIFVs that are fitted with long-range anti-tank missiles.  Such systems wound provide an effective defense against armor without having the offensive strength of MBTs.

Meanwhile, the German navy could focus its attention on the defensive mission to protect NATO’s sea lines of communication to the alliance’s Baltic member states.  Given the maritime environment of the Baltic Sea, that mission would primarily entail coastal diesel-electric submarines, corvettes, and minesweepers, rather than larger oceangoing combatants.  As a corollary to that mission, the German navy could contribute to NATO’s ability to send reinforcements to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with landing ship tanks (LSTs).  Finally, the German air force could focus its resources on filling an air-superiority role (which it apparently already has begun to do), rather than a more offensive ground-support role.  Such an air force would have the added benefit of being able to enforce future defensive no-fly zones.

Even so, if the Bundeswehr is to be seen as non-threatening to its neighbors, one must also consider its force structure.  The Bundeswehr should be appropriately sized relative to those of its neighbors, France and Poland—small enough that they would not find it menacing, but large enough that, when combined with the capabilities of other NATO countries, it would be useful to fend off a foreign threat to the alliance.

Within those criteria, one could envision an expanded German army that includes two armored brigades equipped with Leopard 2A7 MBTs and six mechanized brigades equipped with a new generation of missile-armed Marder AIFVs.  When operating alongside Poland’s heavily armored units (which include 900 MBTs), the German force could help respond to any aggression from the east.  Similarly, a German navy equipped with 12 coastal diesel-electric submarines, 12 corvettes, and 36 minesweepers could help NATO keep its sea lines of communication open to its Baltic member states.  Moreover, the navy could help NATO develop a credible sealift capability with 12 LSTs that could transport relief forces and supplies to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  Finally, the German air force—if equipped with 240 air-superiority fighters (a mix of European-built Eurofighters and American-built F-22 fighters)—could help ensure that NATO controls the skies over Central Europe.

Such a Bundeswehr would be a largely defensive force, essentially incapable of offensive action without the support of its NATO allies.  But it would be one that could make a meaningful contribution to the security of Central Europe and the integrity of the NATO alliance.  Of course, this sort of transformation would not be costless.  It will consume every bit of the military spending increase that Germany promised its NATO allies in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration.  But in making that investment, Berlin could create a force that is worthy of praise from its allies and, perhaps, Germans too.

[1] “Consultants list Bundeswehr blunders,” Deutsche Welle, Oct. 6, 2014, http://dw.de/p/1DR9m; “Merkel peeks over Bundeswehr shortfall parapet,” Deutsche Welle, Oct. 3, 2014, http://dw.de/p/1DPdX; “A German army museum reopens,” Economist, Oct. 15, 2011.

[2] Anton Troianovski, “Ukraine Crisis Spurs Calls in Germany to Reverse Years of Trimming Army,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 9, 2015, p. A10.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,