What on Earth Just Happened in Ukraine?

The February 3 resignation of Ukraine’s Minister of Economic Development and Trade Aivaras Abromavicius sparked another political crisis in Kyiv, a crisis that deepened with a failed vote of no-confidence on February 16. The governing coalition in parliament is unraveling and early parliamentary elections look likely. Analysts fear that a populist or even radical government may come to power, undoing the progress that has been made.


Abromavicius performed admirably, cutting the bloat in his ministry almost in half and driving the privatization of corrupt state enterprises. In his resignation speech, Abromavicius accused Ihor Kononenko, a key player in the Poroshenko Bloc, of attempting to place his own deputy minister in Abromavicius’ ministry to be responsible for state gas and oil company Naftogaz and other state enterprises. By specifically naming Kononenko in his resignation speech, Abromavicius wanted to pressure President Petro Poroshenko and the political establishment to put reforms into high gear and draw the international community’s attention to problems within the government. Abromavicius’ short tenure shows just how difficult attempts to reform are in a country where clientelism and cronyism run deep.

The West’s reaction to the crisis has been both outspoken and frustratingly vague. The West has been unwilling to target the real causes of the crisis. Backing pro-Europe politicians because they support US interests does not mean that one can turn a blind-eye to their failures and flaws. Politicians must be responsive to their own citizens and the needs of their country.

Although a group of 10 ambassadors to Ukraine released a statement expressing strong disappointment at Abromavicius’ resignation and the unwillingness of the Ukrainian parliament to focus on the necessary reforms almost immediately after the minister resigned, the statement referred only to “parochial differences” among Ukraine’s leaders that need to be “set aside” and to “vested interests that have hindered the country’s progress for decades” that must be put “in the past.” On February 10, IMF managing director Christine Lagarde referred to “vested interests” and warned that the IMF could halt its financial support of Ukraine if the government did not do a better job fighting corruption, though she failed to mention any names.

Abromavicius’ high-stakes gamble worked, to some extent: the IMF suspended the next tranche of Ukraine’s $17.5 billion IMF program, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) has already opened an investigation into Abromavicius’s claims, and Kononenko has suspended himself from serving as first deputy chairman of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko.

The international community also took notice. But the imprecise nature of its initial response opened the door to the high political theater of February 16, the consequences of which threaten to undermine reform significantly. In the morning of February 16, Poroshenko sacrificed Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, seen by many as protecting the interests of the old guard, and called for Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk to resign. But Poroshenko was double dealing: he called for Yatsenyuk’s resignation while hoping that he would remain in office, albeit in a weakened state. On the evening of February 16, the parliament deemed the government’s work “unsatisfactory,” but, paradoxically, failed to push Yatsenyuk out in a no-confidence vote by 32 votes. No issues have really been addressed: Kononenko remains in the party, the coalition is fracturing, and the lack of reform has not been addressed.

The West, and especially the United States, has been loath to criticize Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk directly, having supported them as they worked to stabilize the country after disgraced former President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Moscow. The United States, like everyone else, craves stability and predictability. Ukraine’s government, however, is not stable; it is stagnant. Backing Poroshenko unequivocally is no longer the answer, as the greatest obstacle to reform may be that Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk never escaped from the old system that the Euromaidan hoped to dispel. They have not been able to defeat the oligarchic interests that far too often dictate policy in Ukraine, especially as their allies often represent those very interests. The West’s representatives in Ukraine must name names, including oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, and attach concrete strings to the support they are giving Ukraine.

Poroshenko must do more if he wants Ukraine to become a normal European country. His government is extremely unpopular, as a November IRI poll shows: 70 percent of Ukrainians disapprove of the job he is doing, 82 percent disapprove of the job Yatsenyuk is doing, and 83 percent disapprove of the job parliament is doing. Ukrainians want to see visible progress on corruption and reform, and they want their bottom line to improve. The West must support them by publicly pressuring Poroshenko to purge the elements in his bloc and government who are dragging their feet on reform, leaving sentimentality and “vested interests” behind. Unfortunately, Poroshenko himself may be caught too deep in the mire for this to be possible.

Simon Hoellerbauer is a research intern with the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Project on Democratic Transitions and a graduate of Kenyon College. He can be found on Twitter at @hoellerbauers

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Georgia’s Former President Saakashvili appointed the New Governor of Odessa: Implications for Georgia and Ukraine

President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko has appointed Georgia’s former President Mikheil Saakashvili the new governor of Ukraine’s key Odessa region. It is difficult to decipher the bizzare news, but considering the implications this move could have for both Ukraine and Georgia, the issue merits some meditation.


How are Georgians reacting?

What caused the biggest outrage in Georgia was the fact that by accepting the Ukrainian citizenship (required by Ukrainian law in order for one to take office in government) Saakashvili automatically lost, thus deliberately gave up, his Georgian citizenship. It is certainly an unorthodox move for a former president of one country to first give up citizenship of his own country, and second take political office in another country, especially a position that is of much lower rank than that of a presidential office.

Georgian citizenship is something Georgian politicians have taken lightly for a long time,[1] but we’ve seen it used as a tool of political maneuvering recently. In the 2012 parliamentary elections when the Georgian Dream Coalition was formed under the leadership of billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, his lack of Georgian citizenship became an issue. According to Georgian citizenship laws, one automatically loses Georgian citizenship when accepting another. However, it is viewed as a mere technicality, as Georgia allows its citizens to have dual citizenship, which is achieved by requesting to be “granted Georgian citizenship by law of exception.” Ivanishvili had become a Russian and a French citizen, and had never reapplied for Georgian citizenship. Legally he was not allowed to run for office. He later gave up his Russian citizenship and asked for Georgian citizenship—a process that was dragged out for months, and put on a public display by Saakashvili’s government, adding to the already high pre-election campaign pressures. To be sure, this was a process Saakashvili himself was directly involved in, as granting Georgian citizenship is the president’s job there.

Ukraine on the other hand does not allow dual citizenship. Whoever becomes a citizen of Ukraine has to give up his/her other citizenship within two years of obtaining Ukrainian citizenship. In a recent interview given to the Georgian television channel Imedi, Saakashvili, among many other things, explained the reasoning behind this move. It appears that: (1) he sees the issue of citizenship as a technicality to comply with the bureaucratic requirements of taking political office in Ukraine; (2) he does plan to return to Georgia with the hopes of reentering Georgian politics; and (3) he believes in his Georgian supporters more than they believe in him. He thinks all of this will be undone soon, with support of his Georgian voters.

In the interview Saakashvili said that “taking away my Georgian citizenship is the [Georgian] president’s prerogative [this would be in the form of the president rejecting Saakashvili’s application for being granted Georgian citizenship by the law of exception]. If he decides to take my citizenship away, I am sure, this will not be a deciding factor, because for the moment when I return to Georgia, and this will happen much sooner than many imagine, people will make them rescind the indictments against me as well as the act of stripping me of my Georgian citizenship.” Moreover, he went on to explain how he does not see the lack of citizenship as an obstacle. “Eduard Shevardnadze was not a Georgian citizen when he went to Georgia and became its leader; nor was Ivanishvili, when he was running around, conducting his pre-election campaign and became the leader of Georgia. Thus citizenship issue was never an obstacle for anyone, why should it become one for me?”

While he may be technically correct, Saakashvili may have strongly miscalculated this move. Let us set aside for a moment the implications this move will have on Ukraine. All along, Saakashvili has still believed that a comeback as Georgia’s leader was possible for him. He has been counting on the incompetence of the current government—if they bring enough poverty and setbacks to Georgia (which the current Georgian government has already partly achieved), Saakashvili and his party would then regain the people’s confidence, and would be “obligated” to return by popular demand. The Georgian Dream Coalition government may be losing approval ratings due to the worsening economic conditions in the country (the lari has been plummeting since November 2014), but this does not automatically mean that there will be popular demand for Saakashvili in Georgia any time soon (a recent National Democratic Institute poll shows that only 16% of Georgians would vote for Saakashvili’s party). Additionally, if there was any possibility of Saakashvili regaining popularity in Georgia by some miracle, those chances have now been severely diminished thanks to his Ukrainian venture.

The president in exile waited for the Georgian officials to drop charges, but ran out of patience. As he expressed,

…what does Georgian citizenship mean to me today?! Today for me Georgian citizenship means sitting in a prison cell, along with my other friends… therefore, this is purely a matter of formality, although I wanted to avoid it. … I cannot go to Georgia, whether I am a citizen or not, what difference does it make. Therefore as soon as the people make them [the government] void the indictments, when the time comes, they will also resolve the issue of my citizenship. I will distance myself from this formality, but I will always be nearby, whenever the Georgian people desire, if they need me for anything.

Browsing local headlines, this move appears to be seen as a betrayal by many Georgians. Saakashvili and his team are infamous for their impeccable PR skills, yet for someone who wants to return to Georgian politics one day, this is a huge miscalculation. Even his supporters, or what is left of them, are seeing this as a negative move. Georgian government officials have openly condemned his actions. The current president Margvelashvili called it “dishonorable behavior,” saying that with this move Saakashvili has “disgraced the country and the institution of presidency. … A former president should not have given up Georgian citizenship. … Values are more important than career, and these values include being a Georgian citizen. His behavior is incomprehensible to me.”

What does this mean for Ukraine?

So, what is Odessa inheriting from Georgia in Saakashvili? His reforms took Georgia from a nearly failed state to a booming tourist destination with a rapidly growing economy. Foreign direct investment began pouring in thanks to the highly favorable investing conditions Saakashvili created. Rampant corruption and crime disappeared and gave way to high GDP growth rates, free and fair elections, and westernization. The rapid reforms came at a high price for Georgia’s democracy, however. Saakashvili was never able to let go of the power that he had to concentrate in his own hands in the first place in order to effectively implement the reforms. Towards the end of his presidency it became clear that crucial democratic reforms had taken a backseat to the president’s insatiable appetite for contemplating and implementing major development projects in Georgia. At some point Saakashvili swapped out, or even mistook, development for democracy and became unapologetic about being the sole decision-maker in Georgia.

As we’ve already seen, American, Georgian (Saakashvili’s teammates), and Lithuanian individuals were granted Ukrainian citizenship since Poroshenko came into office, so they could take key positions in government. Saakashvili himself was Poroshenko’s advisor on a freelance basis until recently. He had been offered official government positions in Ukraine but had not accepted them. When asked why he turned down these jobs he cited various reasons. Sometimes it was the fact that he did not understand Ukrainian political culture and did not think he could be a part of it. He also said that he did not want to give up his Georgian citizenship (as he was still hoping the charges against him would be dropped and he would return to Georgia after the long exile). And lastly, in an interview earlier this year he expressed that he had reservations over the idea of “having to play nice with others” by working with other political actors in order to achieve consensus to get things done. It looks like the complete autonomy of power is something that Saakashvili is still strongly keen on. Based on Poroshenko’s speech announcing Saakashvili’s appointment, it looks like Saakashvili got exactly that, a full carte blanche to do what he pleases with Odessa, as long as he achieves there what he achieved in Georgia—rapid development and modernization through even faster and effective overnight reforms.

Putting the issue of democracy aside, Saakashvili is likely to achieve these goals in Odessa, but as with Georgia, what will be the cost of this success? Odessa is a region of high strategic importance for Ukraine, but also for Putin’s strategic agenda. Appointing Saakashvili as the head of that region is a direct insult to Putin who infamously despises Saakashvili.[2] If this is not a step back in Ukraine’s attempts at ending the war in its eastern territories, it is certainly not a step forward either. Additionally, now there is a new scenario where Saakashvili could be setting himself up for losing another war with Russia, this time in Odessa.

Yes, Ukraine is desperate for immediate reforms, and there is not enough capacity domestically to implement them effectively. Thus the international community should gladly welcome any bold steps that Poroshenko takes towards achieving that goal. However, the most baffling part in this story is that all of Saakashvili’s competence and expertise could be very effectively utilized from behind the scenes had he chosen to do so, without risking further worsening of already lethal Ukraine-Russia relations.


[1] Vast number of Georgian government officials, current and past, have dual citizenships. The practice of “bringing back” a successful Georgian from abroad and awarding them Georgian citizenship before appointing them to a government position was one that Saakashvili used quite frequently.

[2] For the second half of Saakashvili’s presidency Georgia and Russia did not even have diplomatic ties. The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia got very personal between the two leaders and since then they do not attempt to conceal their hatred for each other in public. 

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Ukraine’s Elections — Further Dismemberment or a Second Chance for Democracy?

By Adrian A. Basora and Aleksandr Fisher

Ukraine’s May 25 presidential election has the potential to restore the country’s prospects for democratization – but there is also a substantial risk that it could prove to be a further step towards the dismemberment of Ukraine. The outcome will depend heavily on whether the Moscow-provoked crisis surrounding them is handled properly by both Ukrainian leaders and by the U.S. and its European allies. 


Precisely because the May 25 vote represents a prospect that all of Ukraine might be ruled democratically from Kiev, Vladimir Putin and his authoritarian elite in Russia had until recently strongly opposed holding elections at all. Putin’s longer-term goal has been de facto dominance of the entire country from Moscow – a goal that seemed within his reach until Viktor Yanukovich abandoned Ukraine’s presidency on February 21 in the face of the Maidan uprising. However, if Putin cannot restore his indirect dominance of Kiev through intimidation and/or negotiations, he is likely to resume his campaign to slice off Ukraine’s eastern provinces one or two at a time in order to bring them under direct Russian control, even if nominally independent. This could ultimately create Putin’s version of a “Greater Novorossyia” which would encompass about 45% of Ukraine’s population and two-thirds of its GDP.[1]

The pattern has already been set. After Yanukovich fled Ukraine on February 21, Moscow seized Crimea within a matter of weeks, working largely through local surrogates. The same scenario is well along in the much more populous and industrialized provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk.[2] Their sham independence referenda on May 11 were designed to provide a pretext either to incorporate them into the Russian Federation, or to run them as nominally independent states (as with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia since 2008). These two easternmost provinces constitute nearly 20% of Ukraine’s population and 22% of its industrial production. This is on top of the 4% of the country’s population already subtracted by Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Absent skillful maneuvering by Ukraine’s democratically-oriented leaders, backed by strong Western measures, there is a significant threat that Ukraine will subjected to gradual stealth dismemberment. Alternatively, if the new government in Kiev chooses to take military action to hold its eastern provinces, the country could be plunged into a prolonged civil war. In the latter case, Moscow’s current covert support for the minority separatist movement could well evolve into overt military intervention. Either scenario would have far more severe implications for democracy in the region, and for western interests more generally, than did Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.

The May 25 Election as an Existential Threat

Given these grim possibilities, the upcoming election on May 25, 2014 will be critical in determining Ukraine’s future. If the balloting is properly administered and monitored, this will have a powerful legitimizing effect on the Kiev government, not only in the eyes of the Ukrainian people but also throughout Europe and Eurasia and in the international community.

However, Moscow’s massive propaganda machine and its covert operations on the ground continue efforts to undercut the elections and cast doubt on their legitimacy. Russian-instigated groups agitating for secession have established either dominance or high levels of intimidation in several eastern provinces, leading to violent skirmishes and to dismantling of polling stations.[3] This violence and potentially low voter turnout in the east could then be used by Moscow to claim that the elections had failed to produce a legitimate mandate.

Similarly, the May 11 independence referenda in Donetsk and Luhansk could well be used to engineer these two key provinces’ secession from Ukraine – unless the new president accedes to Moscow’s demands either for a subservient Ukrainian government or for a loose confederation in which Russia could exert de facto control over the eastern provinces. To add still further pressure on the new government in Kiev, Moscow-inspired separatist movements in Kharkiv, Odessa and other provinces with a predominance of Russian speakers could be quickly re-launched.

How Can Dismemberment or Subservience be Avoided?

For the upcoming elections in Ukraine to have a positive impact on the stability, territorial integrity and democratic growth of the country, several factors will be critical:

First, the polls themselves must be well organized. Domestically, over 75,000 personnel, including 55,700 policemen and more than 20,000 volunteers will be on hand to try to ensure that the elections run smoothly.[4]  The Ukrainian interim government has also already set up 114 polling stations in 75 countries for the over 470,000 of Ukrainian voters who are abroad.[5]

However, the government has had some difficulty organizing its domestic electoral machinery, mostly in terms of finding reliable staff, due to the recent “secessions” of Donetsk and Luhansk. University of Kansas political scientist Erik Herron is correct in judging that “the quality of Ukraine’s election will ultimately be determined on the ground by the efforts of hundreds of thousands of election workers and security personnel, as well as the millions of Ukrainian citizens who come to the polls.”[6]

Second, there should be a large number of independent and well-deployed international election monitors to ensure that the elections are conducted fairly and without major incidents of fraud. Moscow will be sure to allege acts of fraud regardless of their actual occurrence and so, to maximize the perceived legitimacy of the elections, these claims must be quickly rebutted by a host of independent international observers. Thus, what will hopefully be the positive findings of the main electoral monitoring groups should be well-publicized.

As of mid-May, over 200 volunteers from the U.S. have gone to Ukraine to help ensure clean and fair elections. [7]  They will join over 1000 election monitors from the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[8] These actions by the international community and by the Ukrainian government are important steps in the right direction in helping to ensure a democratic and stabilizing outcome on May 25, but they should be bolstered by aggressive publicity and by strong statements of endorsement by Western governments and international organizations.

Finally, it would be highly propitious if one candidate were to win convincingly on May 25. If no candidate wins over 50% in the first round, Ukraine will have to wait until June 15 for the second round. A mud-slinging campaign could easily play into Moscow’s hands, and the period between the first and second rounds would also provide more time for Russian agents and their internal allies in the east to establish new facts on the ground.

In sum, it is in the strong interest of Ukrainian democrats and of their Western supporters to encourage the creation of a stable government as quickly as possible in order to minimize the opportunities for further Russian incursions.

The Candidates

According to the most recent poll, Petro Poroshenko, the “chocolate oligarch”, who played a fundamental role in funding and organizing protesters at Maidan, has a strong lead with 34% of the vote. He is trailed by former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko at 6.5%, and pro-“federalization” candidate Sergei Tihipko at 5.8%, with 25% undecided.[9] Among voters who have made up their minds, Poroshenko is projected to receive 54.7% of the vote, which would allow him to win in the first round and avoid a runoff.[10] However, if enough Ukrainians abstain from voting, either voluntarily or as a result of intimidation from pro-Russian separatists, Moscow could threaten to brand the election of Poroshenko as illegitimate and use this as leverage to insist on subservience and/or greater autonomy for the eastern provinces.

A victory by Poroshenko in the first round would obviously give Ukraine the best chance for a more democratic and western-oriented Ukraine. His previous history of supporting democracy in Ukraine during the Orange revolution in 2004 – and his very early participation in the EuroMaidan movement last fall, long before its prospects for success became clear – make Poroshenko the most promising candidate to lead Ukraine’s democracy. Although he is himself an oligarch who had previously served in the Yanukovitch government, Poroshenko is now running on a platform of zero tolerance for corruption, Ukrainian integration into the European Union, and economic reform.[11]But he has wisely also said he would not seek NATO membership and is seen as someone who might be able to deal skillfully with Moscow.

Despite her current strongly pro-democratic rhetoric, Tymoshenko’s failures as Prime Minister (2007 to 2010) and shady earlier ties to Russia make her a dubious presidential prospect if Ukraine is to escape its legacy of autocracy and corruption. And Tihipko’s ties to Yanukovych’s former party, the Party of Regions, also make him a questionable candidate to lead a new independent and democratic Ukraine.

An Urgent Post-Election Agenda

Even if the elections are won convincingly by Poroshenko and strongly certified by international election monitors, the actions of the new government – and of the Western democracies – in the days and weeks after elections will be critical. Given Ukraine’s precarious economic and geopolitical situation, it is critical that democracy is shown triumphing over authoritarianism or separatist nationalism.

To do this, the Ukrainian government, with the strong backing and financial assistance of Western governments and international financial institutions,[12] must rapidly engineer a rescue of the bankrupt and stagnant Ukrainian economy. This requires making Ukraine’s economy more hospitable to business. According to the Heritage Foundation, Ukraine ranks last in economic freedom in Europe.[13] In order to restore economic growth and create jobs, the new Ukrainian government must eliminate the culture of corruption, promote domestic business growth, and encourage foreign investment. The IMF and the current Ukrainian government have already agreed on completing a comprehensive diagnostic study by July 15 that will cover “an anti-corruption framework, the design and implementation of key laws and regulations that may have impact on business climate, the effectiveness of the judiciary, and tax administration.”[14]

By creating a favorable business climate and encouraging economic growth in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government can demonstrate the advantages of democracy over Russia’s growing authoritarianism and economic stagnation (especially by showing higher rates of growth in Ukraine than in Russia-annexed Crimea). 

On the domestic political front, it will be essential for the new president to woo back and reassure the many disaffected Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine who have either backed the separatist movement or else been either intimidated or indifferent. And here the role of Russia could prove crucial. If Moscow continues to promote violent conflict between the new government in Kiev and the “independent” Donetsk and Luhansk regions or other eastern provinces, then the odds will be long for either economic prosperity or political stability.

There could now be a new chance for movement towards democracy and national unity in Ukraine — but only if strong leadership emerges from the election and receives prompt and solid backing from the European Union and from the United States.



[1]Adrian A. Basora and Aleksandr Fisher. “Putin’s “Greater Novorossiya” – The Dismemberment of Ukraine.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. /articles/2014/05/putins-greater-novorossiya-dismemberment-ukraine (accessed May 21, 2014).

[2] On May 11, two of Ukraine’s eastern regions with large Russian speaking populations, Donetsk and Luhansk, voted for sovereignty with 89% and 96% approval respectively.

[3]Miller, Christopher J. . “Gunmen seize control of district election offices in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, steal ballots and documents.” KievPost. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/gunmen-seize-control-of-district-election-offices-in-donetsk-and-luhansk-oblasts-steal-ballots-and-documents-348578.html (accessed May 21, 2014).

[4] Interfax-Ukraine. “Over 55,000 police personnel, thousands of volunteers to maintain order on polling day.” KyivPost. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/over-55000-police-personnel-thousands-of-volunteers-to-maintain-order-on-polling-day-348599.html (accessed May 21, 2014).

[5] Interfax-Ukraine. “114 polling stations set up abroad ahead of Ukrainian presidential elections.” KyivPost. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/114-polling-stations-set-up-abroad-ahead-of-ukrainian-presidential-elections-347796.html (accessed May 21, 2014).

[6] Herron, Erik. “Is Ukraine ready to vote?.” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/18/is-ukraine-ready-to-vote/ (accessed May 21, 2014).

[7] Selweski, Chad . “Local Ukrainian leader will help monitor election in homeland.” The Daily Tribune. http://www.dailytribune.com/government-and-politics/20140515/local-ukrainian-leader-will-help-monitor-election-in-homeland (accessed May 21, 2014).

[8] Interfax-Ukraine. “1,000 OSCE observers to oversee presidential elections in Ukraine.” KyivPost. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/1000-osce-observers-to-oversee-presidential-elections-in-ukraine-347489.html (accessed May 21, 2014).

[9] Interfax-Ukraine. “Poroshenko way ahead of rivals in Ukrainian presidential race.” KyivPost. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/poroshenko-way-ahead-of-rivals-in-ukrainian-presidential-race-348615.html (accessed May 21, 2014).

[10] Herszenhorn, David D.. “Front-Runner in Ukraine Election May Be Shifting Putin’s Stance.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/world/europe/frontrunner-in-ukraine-election-may-be-shifting-putins-stance.html?_r=0 (accessed May 21, 2014).

[11] Popova, Polina. “Petro Poroshenko: Is the Chocolate King Fit to Run Ukraine? – Foreign Policy Journal.” Foreign Policy Journal. http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/09/petro-poroshenko-is-the-chocolate-king-fit-to-run-ukraine/ (accessed May 21, 2014).

[12] The IMF has approved a $17 billion dollar loan to Ukraine which will focus on reforming exchange rate flexibility, banking stability, fiscal policy, energy policy, and governance. International Monetary Fund. “IMF.” IMF Survey : Ukraine Unveils Reform Program with IMF Support. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/new043014a.htm (accessed May 21, 2014).

[13] The Heritage Foundation. “Ukraine.” Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/ukraine (accessed May 20, 2014).

[14] Interfax-Ukraine. “114 polling stations set up abroad ahead of Ukrainian presidential elections.” KyivPost. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/114-polling-stations-set-up-abroad-ahead-of-ukrainian-presidential-elections-347796.html (accessed May 21, 2014).


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